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Reyes: Telecommuters and Their Virtual Existence in the Unemployment Wor

NOTE
TELECOMMUTERS AND THEIR VIRTUAL
EXISTENCE IN THE UNEMPLOYMENT WORLD
I.

INTRODUCTION

For the first time, an out-of-state telecommuter was disqualified
from receiving Unemployment Insurance (UI) from the state in which
the telecommuter's former employer was located.' Although an out-ofstate telecommuter's work is done electronically via the Internet, the
New York Court of Appeals rejected the argument that a telecommuter's
work cannot be "localized in any state." 2 The justification for this
holding rested on a definition of employment,3 which is codified into
almost every state's UI laws.4 By holding that physical presence
determines the localization of the work performed,5 the court created a
significant hurdle for out-of-state telecommuters to overcome in order to
show eligibility for UI benefits. Moreover, this court's holding,
compelled by a uniformly applied definition of employment, necessitates
amendments to each state's UL laws to permit an out-of-state
telecommuter to collect UI benefits from the state in which the former
employer is located.
Since the inception of the Internet in the 1990s, telecommuting has
risen exponentially 6 because it created a win-win situation for both
1. See In re Claim of Allen, 794 N.E.2d 18 (N.Y. 2003).
2. Id.at 22.
3. Id.at 21 (quoting N.Y. LAB. LAW § 511(3) (2002)). "Employment" includes services
completed both inside and outside the state so long as it is not localized in any particular state. See
Claim ofAllen, 794 N.E.2d at 21.
4. See, e.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 25-4-10(a)(8) (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2003); CAL.
UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 602-03 (West 1986); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 511(3) (2002).
5. See Claim of Allen, 794 N.E.2d at 22.
6. See Donna Lenhoff & Claudia Withers, Implementation of the Family and Medical Leave
Act: Toward the Family-Friendly Workplace, 3 AM. U.J. GENDER & LAW 39, 56 (1994) (estimating
that there were five million telecommuters nationwide in 1991); International Telework Association
& Council, Telework America 2001, available at http://www.workingfromanywhere.org/
telework/twa2001 .htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2005) [hereinafter Telework America 2001] (indicating
that there were twenty-eight million telecommuters in 2001).
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employers and employees. 7 In 2001, there were twenty-eight million
telecommuters,8 and according to a survey conducted by the
International Telework Association & Council in 2000, approximately
19% of telecommuters have out-of-state supervisors. 9 By advocating
telecommuting, employers benefit not only through realized savings in
expenditures, 10 but also in responding to political pressure to help
preserve the environment" and to be more "family-friendly.' ' 12 For
employees, telecommuting allows them to spend more3 time with their
families and to be more independent during work time.'
Information technology has progressed to the point where
businesses are electronic to varying degrees, where "at one
extreme ... workplaces.., are completely virtual."' 4 These employees,
who work in virtual workplaces, are commonly known as
telecommuters. 15 In virtual workplaces, employer policies have been
revamped to enable workers to complete their work electronically and
7. Employees value telecommuting because they enjoy "greater flexibility, reduced stress,
and fewer distractions from work," and employers value telecommuting because it "increasels]
productivity, lower[s] real estate costs, and improve[s] recruitment." Matthew Mariani, Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Telecommuters, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK Q., 10, 13 (Fall 2000).
8. See Telework America 2001, supranote 6.
9. See JACK M. NILLES, INT'L TELEWORK ASS'N & COUNCIL, TELEWORK AMERICA 2000
RESEARCH: KEY FINDINGS (2000), available at http://www.workingfromanywhere.org/
pdf/ITACTeleworkAmerica2000KeyFindings.pdf (indicating that in 2000, approximately
3,135,000, or 19% of all telecommuters, had supervisors that were not located in the same state as
the telecommuter). For example, Northern Telecom Ltd., a Tennessee-based service operation, hired
a Philadelphia-based man as a vice-president who supervises a staff of 1,000, including his
Nashville-based secretary, from his home. Edward C. Baig, Welcome to the Officeless Office:
Telecommuting May Finally Be Out of the Experimental Stage, BUS. WK., June 26, 1995, at 104,
availableat 1995 WL 2230210 [hereinafter Baig, Officeless Office].
10. Baig, Officeless Office, supra note 9 (reporting that Ernst & Young saved $25,000,000 in
real estate costs in one year by allowing its workers to telecommute).
11. Edward C. Baig, Saying Adios to the Office, Bus. WK., Oct. 12, 1998, at 152, available at
1998 WL 19884349 [hereinafter Baig, Saying Adios].
12. Brenda Smith, Time Norms in the Workplace: Their ExclusionaryEffect and Potentialfor
Change, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 271, 300 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Lenhoff & Withers, supra note 6, at 56.
13. See Baig, Saying Adios, supra note 11; Mariani, supra note 7, at 13. But see generally,
Michelle A. Travis, New Perspectives on Work/Family Conflict: Telecommuting: The Escher
Stairway of Work/Family Conflict, 55 ME. L. REV. 261, 270-71 (2003) (explaining that some
telecommuters did not experience greater independence or an improvement in the quality of their
family lives as a result of telecommuting).
14. Martin H. Malin & Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The National Labor RelationsAct in Cyberspace:
Union Organizingin Electronic Workplaces, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 18 (2000).
15. See Mariani, supra note 7, at 10. Telecommuting has generally been defined as "the use of
computer and communications technology to transport work to the worker as a substitute for
physical transportation of the worker to the location of the work." Travis, supra note 13, at 268
(internal quotations marks omitted).
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from outside of their employers' physical offices. 16 Furthermore,
telecommuters are more likely to communicate with co-workers and
supervisors via17 electronic mail than interact with them in any single
physical place.

The New York Court of Appeals's decision in In re Claim of
Allen' 8 is particularly worrisome for the growing number of
telecommuters. The Claim of Allen decision turns the telecommuting
arrangement into a zero-sum game where the employer wins and the
employee loses in the event of layoff or discharge. As a result, the Claim
ofAllen decision may lead to a chilling effect whereby employees, leery
of the possibility of being ineligible for UI benefits, will decline to enter
into telecommuting arrangements with their employers.
Despite all the vaunted advantages of telecommuter policies,
telecommuting employees stand to lose the most if discharged by an
employer. Ironically, the policy reasons that led to the adoption of
telecommuting arrangements in the workplace are the very same reasons
why UI benefits would be denied to out-of-state telecommuters. For
example, the opportunity to spend more time at home or with family is a
prevalent reason why employees choose to telecommute. 19 However,
when the costs of maintaining telecommuting become unjustified for the
employer, the telecommuter is forced to choose between family and
work.2°

If an out-of-state telecommuter chooses family over work, then the
telecommuter faces two hurdles to eligibility for UI benefits. The first
hurdle is that, in choosing family over work, it can be argued that the
telecommuter voluntarily quit and became unemployed through his or
her own fault. 2 1 But rather than explore the viability of the voluntary quit
16. See Travis, supra note 13, at 267-68; see also Joan T.A. Gabel & Nancy R. Mansfield,
The Information Revolution and Its Impact on the Employment Relationship: An Analysis of the
Cyberspace Workplace, 40 AM. Bus. L.J. 301, 302-03 (2003). A woman who worked as a senior

communications analyst at Visa International's headquarters in San Francisco was able to continue
her employment with Visa after moving to Pensacola, Florida. Baig, Saying Adios, supra note 11.
17. See Malin & Perritt, supranote 14, at 18.
18. 794 N.E.2d 18 (N.Y. 2003) (affirming the denial of the plaintiff's claim for
unemployment insurance where the plaintiff was an out-of-state telecommuter of a New York
employer).
19. Mariani, supra note 7, at 13-14.
20. See, e.g., Claim of Allen, 794 N.E.2d 18, 19-20 (N.Y. 2003); Claim of Allen, 741
N.Y.S.2d 342, 343 (App. Div. 2002).
21. See, e.g., Claim ofAllen, 794 N.E.2d at 20 (denying UI benefits to the plaintiff who chose
not to return to New York once the employer chose to end the telecommuting arrangement). But see
CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1256 (West 1986 & Supp. 2003) (deeming an employee to have left with
good cause if he or she quit to follow a spouse or domestic partner to a place "from which it's
impractical to commute"). Generally, most UI laws require that an employee became unemployed
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argument in the foregoing scenario, this Note focuses on the second
hurdle, which is that in performing the services outside the state where
such services were directed or controlled by the employer, the
telecommuter becomes ineligible for UI benefits in the employer's
state.22
Even the federal government recognizes that the telecommuters'
worksites are not located in their homes, but at the "office to which they
report and from which assignments are made. 2 3 The United States
Department of Labor promulgated the regulation locating telecommuters
in their employers' offices for the purpose of resolving the issue of
whether the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) 24 includes
telecommuters as workers employed within seventy-five miles of the
employer's worksite in order to bring the employer within the scope of
the Act.25 Since the Department of Labor regulation only concerns

administration of the FMLA, it has no binding effect on the states in the
administration of their UI programs. Consequently, the New York Court
of Appeals was under no obligation to consider the aforementioned
regulation in Claim of Allen, and at best, the regulation could only have
served as persuasive authority.
This Note proposes that work performed by out-of-state
telecommuters is not localized in any state, and the first test to determine
eligibility for UI benefits should be the Direction and Control test. Part
II will discuss the history of UI, the requirements to be eligible for Ul
benefits, and the uniformity of the states' laws providing for these
benefits. Part III analyzes the recent opinions of the New York Court of
Appeals in Claim of Allen, which denied UI benefits to an out-of-state

through no fault of his or her own unless the employee exhausted all reasonable efforts to rectify the
situation. See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1256. For a discussion of the "voluntary quit
exhaustion requirement," see Deborah Maranville, Workplace Mythologies and Unemployment
Insurance: Exit, Voice, and Exhausting All Reasonable Alternatives to Quitting, 31 HOFSTRA L.

REV. 459, 463-67 (2002).
22. In New York, an out-of-state telecommuter, residing in Florida, was ineligible to receive
UI benefits from NY, the state from which the employer directed or controlled the services, because
the out-of-state telecommuter was not physically present within New York. See Claim ofAllen, 794
N.E.2d at 22. A vast majority of states, forty-six and the District of Columbia to be exact, apply the

same definition as New York and Claim of Allen is a harbinger of the hard times ahead for out-ofstate telecommuters who apply for UI benefits when their position is effectively eliminated at the
end of the telecommuting arrangement. See Note, Unemployment Compensationfor Multi-State
Workers, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 993, 993-94 n.3 (1949) [hereinafter Multi-State Workers]; VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 1301(6)(A)(iii) (1987).
23. Labor, Family and Medical Leave Act Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 825.11 l(a)(2) (2003).

24. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (2000).
25.

See § 825.11 l(a)(2); see also Gabel & Mansfield, supranote 16, at 341.
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telecommuter, and in Zelinsky v. Tax Appeal Tribunal,26 which ratified
the multiple taxation of out-of-state commuters, and telecommuters by
extension. 27 Part IV discusses court decisions where personal jurisdiction
was proper where non-resident defendants were only electronically
present in the forum state. The purpose of this discussion is to argue that
the supervising employer's state which can hold an out-of-state
telecommuter liable for damages to the employer's property, ought to be
responsible for providing UI benefits to that same out-of-state
telecommuter. Finally, Part V discusses potential drawbacks and their
remedies in administering UI to out-of-state telecommuters once they
are initially deemed eligible to receive UI benefits.
II.

BACKGROUND

In 1935, Congress passed the Social Security Act, which proposed a
federal UI program in response to the states' inability to provide public
assistance to the unemployed during the Great Depression.28 UI is a
temporary benefit granted to a claimant who lost his or her job
involuntarily, who is able and available to work, and who has earned a
minimal amount of wages (as determined by state law) in the year
preceding termination of employment. 29 The Act did not establish a
formal UI compensation system; 30 rather, Congress encouraged the
states to create their own UI systems in exchange for credit to their
federal tax liability if the state's system conformed with federal
guidelines.31
The states accepted Congress's invitation to create UI programs and
designed systems where the employers contribute to the states' UI
funds.32 Under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, the excise tax paid
by an employer to a state UI fund is credited toward the employer's tax
liability.33 An employer's tax liability depends on its experience rating.34

26.
27.
28.
301 U.S.

801 N.E.2d 840 (N.Y. 2003).
See id at 848.
Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397f (2000); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis,
548, 587-88 (1937); Laurence C. Nolan, The UnconstitutionalConditions Doctrine and

Mandating Norplantfor Women on Welfare Discourse, 3 AM. U.J. GENDER & LAW 15, 18 (2000);

Smith, supra note 12, at 309.
29. In re Claim of Allen, 794 N.E.2d 18,21 (N.Y. 2003).
30. See Smith, supra note 12, at 309 n.160.
31. See I.R.C. § 3304 (West 2002); see also Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 592-93.
Employers are also eligible to receive the credit to their federal tax liability if they contribute to a
federally-approved state UI fund. See I.R.C. § 3302(a)(1) (2000).
32. See Federal Unemployment Tax Act, I.R.C. §§ 3301-11 (2000).
33. See I.R.C. § 3302.
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Interestingly, after the Claim of Allen decision some attorneys suggested
that employers should enter into telecommuting arrangements with outof-state employees so that terminations of telecommuting employees
will not cause an increase in the employer's experience rating and will
ultimately reduce the employer's overall tax liability in the long-run.35
A.

Definition of Employment

While the states accepted Congress's invitation to create UI
programs, the programs' definitions of "employment" varied.36 These
various definitions led to uncertainty as to the application of UL
programs across the states.37 In order to combat the growing uncertainty,
the Legal Affairs Committee of the Interstate Conference of
Unemployment Compensation Administrators and the Federal Bureau of
Unemployment Compensation promoted a uniform definition of
"employment" that was eventually adopted by forty-six states and the
District of Columbia. 38 The uniform definition provides, in pertinent
part:
(1) "Employment" means service, including service in interstate
commerce performed for remuneration or under any contract of hire,
written or oral, expressed or implied.
(2) The term "employment" shall include an individual's entire
service, performed within or both within and without this State if:

34. See 1.R.C. § 3301. An employer's experience rating increases every time it terminates a
worker who ultimately files a U1 claim with the state. See Stewart J. Schwab, Predictingthe Future
of Employment Law: Reflecting orRefracting Market Forces?, 76 IND. L.J. 29,39 (2001).
35. See Michael J. Album & Gershom R. Smith, Telecommuting After Allen, 230 N.Y.L.J. 5
(2003) (both authors are attorneys employed in the New York office of Proskauer Rose LLP).
Album and Smith also indicate that shifting from intra-state employees to out-of-state employees
decreases an employer's taxable wage base, which will also lead to tax savings. Id.
36. In re Claim of Mallia, 86 N.E.2d 577, 579 (N.Y. 1949). For examples of the varying
definitions of employment, see Multi State Workers, supra note 22, at 993-94 n.3.
37. See Claim of Mallia, 86 N.E.2d at 580; Multi-State Workers, supra note 22, at 993-94 n.3.
38. See, e.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 186 (Supp. 1947) (currently codified at ALA. CODE
ANN. tit. 25, § 25-4-10(8) (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2003)); CAL. GEN. LAWS Act 8780, § 6.5 (1944)
(currently codified at CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 602-03 (West 1986); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 511
(1939) (currently codified at N.Y. LAB. LAW § 511(3) (2002). By 1949, forty-five states adopted the
uniform definition. Multi-State Workers, supra note 22, at 993-94 n.3. Vermont eventually adopted
the uniform definition as well. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1301(6)(A)(iii) (1987). However, Kansas
and Virginia continue to apply substantially different definitions of "employment." See KANS.
STAT. ANN. § 44-703(i)(2) (2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 60.2-212 (Michie 2001).
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(A) The service is localized in this State; or
(B) The service is not localized in any State but some of the service
is performed in this State, and (i) the individual's base of operation, or
if there is no base of operations, then the place from which such
service is directed or controlled, is in this State; or (ii) if the
individual's base of operations or place from which such service is
directed or controlled is not in any State in which some part of the
service is performed, but the individual's residence is in this State....
(5) Service shall be deemed to be localized within a State if:
(A) the service is performed entirely within such State; or
(B) the service is performed both within and without such State, but
the service performed without such State is incidental to the
individual's services within the State, for example, is
39 temporary or
transitory in nature, or consists of isolated transactions.
In short, the uniform definition proposed four tests to be applied
successively.40 If the first test, which will be referred to as the
Localization test, reveals a single state in which the services were
performed, then the state unemployment agency need not apply the other
tests. Localization of services is difficult to determine only when the
claimant performed his or her job in more than one state. In these
situations, the state agency must determine whether the services
performed in one state can be deemed so substantial as to render the
services performed in the other state(s) incidental to those performed in
the first state. 41 For example, suppose that a claimant (who filed for UI
benefits in Washington D.C.) commuted to Washington D.C. to work in
the employer's office everyday but was allowed to work from home in
Virginia every other Friday. Under the Localization test, the claimant's
services would be localized in Washington D.C., and the services
performed in Virginia would be considered incidental to the services
performed in Washington D.C. Therefore, Washington D.C. would be
the appropriate jurisdiction in which to claim Ul benefits.
When the Localization test fails to indicate a single state in which
the services were performed, then the state agency must use the second
39.
40.
41.

Multi-Stale Workers, supra note 22, at 994 n.3 (internal quotations omitted).
See id. at 995; see also In reClaim of Allen, 794 N.E.2d 18,21 (N.Y. 2003).
See Multi-State Workers, supra note 22, at 995.
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test, which will be referred to as the Base of Operations test. If the Base
of Operations test reveals a single state in which the claimant's base of
operations is located, then the state agency will not apply the third or
fourth tests. The Base of Operations test asks where the claimant's
physical base of operation is located in order to .determine a single state
in which the services were performed. A physical base of operations is a
fixed place to which the claimant reported during the course of
employment. 42
For example, suppose a claimant was employed as a commercial
deliveryman and filed for UI benefits in New York after being laid off;
the claimant, who resides in New Jersey, traveled between New Jersey
and Pennsylvania equally in order to make deliveries. The claimant
regularly went to the employer's warehouse in New York in order to
pick up deliveries, and to get his delivery truck repaired by his employer
from time to time. The Localization test would fail to determine a single
responsible state because the services performed outside New York are
not incidental to those performed within New York. Under the Base of
Operations test, New York would be the sole responsible state because
the claimant regularly reported to the employer's New York warehouse,
a fixed physical location.
If the second test fails to identify a single state in which the
claimant's base of operations exists, then the state agency must apply the
third test, which will be referred to as the Direction and Control test. If
the Direction and Control test reveals a single state from which the
the claimant, then the state agency will
employer directed and controlled
43
not apply the fourth test.

Suppose a former office worker, who lives in Nevada, had split his
time equally between remote offices located in California and Nevada,
and after being laid off, he filed for UI benefits in California because his
supervisor sent assignments and instructions as to which location he
should report from an office in San Diego. The Localization test fails
because the services performed in Nevada are not incidental to those
performed at the remote office in California. The Base of Operations test
also fails because the claimant spent an equal amount of time working in
both Nevada and California. The Direction and Control test resolves the
issue because the claimant received instructions and assignments and
was generally supervised by his employer located in California.

42. See id.
43. See id.
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Therefore, the claimant's application for Ul benefits in California would
be proper.
However, assuming that the foregoing tests failed to reveal a single
state responsible for providing the U[ benefits, then the fourth test
resorts to the location of the claimant's residence. Under the fourth test,
the claimant in the last hypothetical would only be eligible for UI
benefits in Nevada because that is where the claimant resides.
The premise supporting the limitation of "employment" to services
performed at least substantially within one state assumed that the
claimant would be physically present in the state where UI benefits were
requested. 44 The uniform definition is based on the notion that only one
45
state should be responsible for providing UT benefits to the claimant,
and that state should be one where the claimant is most likely to seek
and to find work. 6 It was also generally thought that unemployment
benefits would be linked to the cost of living in the area where the
claimant resides.4 7
The foregoing policy considerations favoring the claimant's
physical presence are outdated and obsolete. The fact that costs of living
determine the amount of UI benefits available to a claimant ignores the
fact that UI benefit awards depend, in large part, on the wages earned by
the claimant during the base period.48 Furthermore, the Internet is a vast
resource that aids job seekers in finding employment at physical and
virtual workplaces anywhere in the country. 49 Finally, focusing on the
place from which the employer directs or controls the telecommuter is
more efficient because employers' tax liability will be limited to one
state thereby easing the task of forecasting future tax liability.

44.
45.
46.
47.

See Claim ofAllen, 794 N.E.2d at 22.
Multi-State Workers, supra note 22, at 995.
Claim ofMallia, 86 N.E.2d 577, 580 (N.Y. 2001).
See Claim ofAllen, 794 N.E.2d at 22.

48. See, e.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 25-4-72(b) (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2003) (awarding
U1 benefits based on the following calculation: one twenty-fourth of the average of the wages for
insured work paid to the individual during the two quarters of his or her base period in which such
total wages were the highest); FLA. STAT. § 443.111(3) (West 2002) (awarding "one twenty-sixth of
the total wages for insured work paid during that quarter of the base period"); N.Y. LAB. LAW
§ 590(5) (2002) (awarding "one twenty-sixth of the remuneration paid during the highest calendar
quarter of the base period").
49. A few examples of job search engines that have nationwide listings include
http://www.monster.com; http://www.careerbuilder.com; and http://hotjobs.yahoo.com.
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The Requirement of Involuntary Unemployment

Once a claimant shows that the employment occurred substantially
in the state where benefits are claimed, it must be proven that one
became unemployed through no fault of one's own. For the most part,
this means that a UI claimant may not quit the job and expect to receive
Ul benefits unless there is good cause therefore. Even when good cause
can be demonstrated, the claimant must also show that all reasonable
alternatives to quitting were exhausted. 50 This is a common ground on
which employers contest the claimant's eligibility for UI; 5 1 failure to
rebut the employer's objection renders the claimant ineligible for UI
benefits.
The requirement to exhaust all reasonable alternatives before
quitting for good cause is in place to lessen what economists call moral
hazard on the part of employees.5 2 The moral hazard problem occurs
where employees do not take care to preserve their job rights or to
search for a new job because they know UI will cushion their lack of
income after termination.53 Some courts think that an employee's failure
good cause was not
to exhaust all reasonable alternatives is evidence that
54
present or that the employee was a "malcontent.,
Arguably, even if an out-of-state telecommuter can establish that
the services were performed, and therefore localized, in the employer's
state, the telecommuter still has the burden of showing that he or she did
not voluntarily terminate the employment relationship. This would be
particularly difficult to do if the employer offered a position to the
telecommuter in the employer's office, as in Claim of Allen, 55 once the
decision was made to end the telecommuting arrangement. Even if one
concedes that the telecommuter voluntarily ended the employment
relationship, the telecommuter could still be eligible for UL benefits
through the satisfaction of an exhaustion requirement included in a state
UI program. However, as previously stated, the involuntary

50. See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1256 (West 1986 & Supp. 2003); N.Y. LAB. LAW
§ 593(1) (2002); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 192-16-009(1)(c) (1977); see also Maranville, supra note

21, at 460.
51.

See Maranville, supra note 21, at 460.

52. See Schwab, supra note 34, at 38.
53. See id.
54. See Maranville, supra note 21, at 471; see also Stefen v. Davison, Copple, Copple &
Copple, 814 P.2d 29, 30 (Idaho 1991); Johns v. Dep't Employment Sec., 686 P.3d 517, 520 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1984).
55. See In re Claim of Allen, 794 N.E.2d 18, 20 (N.Y. 2003). In fact, the employer in Claim
of Allen objected to the claimant's application for UI benefits in Florida on the grounds that the
claimant chose to become unemployed. See id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol33/iss2/10

10

Reyes: Telecommuters and Their Virtual Existence in the Unemployment Wor
20041

TELECOMMUTERS IN THE UNEMPLOYMENT WORLD

unemployment question is moot if the out-of-state telecommuter cannot
overcome a physical presence hurdle to the localization test.
III.

VIRTUAL PRESENCE FOR TAXATION AND UI BENEFIT PURPOSES

The problem of proving that the telecommuter was employed and
present in the employer's state still remains, and arguments to adopt the
Direction and Control test as the primary test in such a determination can
be found in the difference with which presence is treated for taxation
purposes. In New York, at least, there is some incongruity as to how the
law treats the presence of out-of-state commuters, and telecommuters by
extension, for taxation and UI benefit purposes. With regard to
applications for UI benefits, New York places the out-of-state
telecommuter's services in the state where the telecommuter is
physically present. 56 Yet for income tax calculations, New York
apportions work performed at home by the out-of-state employee to the
New York source if the work is performed at home by reason of
convenience to the employee rather than by the necessity of the
employer. 57 Consequently, an out-of-state telecommuter would still be
liable for non-resident income taxes owed to the New York-based
employer for the income earned from working at home because the work
would be allocated to the employer's state, but would be ineligible to
receive UI benefits from New York once the employment relationship is
terminated because the same taxable work is performed in the state
where the telecommuter is physically present. Just as Professor Bernard
Jacob and Professor Edward Zelinsky have observed with multiple
taxation of out-of-state telecommuters,5 8 the problems caused by denial
of UI benefits to out-of-state telecommuters will become prevalent as the
number of telecommuters increases. As a result, the difference with
which New York treats out-of-state telecommuters for taxation and UI
benefit purposes will only grow more apparent and pervasive over time.
A.

The In re Claim of Allen 59 Cases

In 1996, Maxine Allen began working for Reuters as a development
technical specialist in New York.6 ° In 1997, when Allen moved to
56. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 511(3) (2002); Claim ofAllen, 794 N.E.2d at 21.
57. See Zelinsky v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 801 N.E.2d 840, 846 (N.Y. 2003); N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 132.18(a) (2003).
58. See Bernard E. Jacob, An Extended Presence, Interstate Style: First Notes on a Theme
from Saenz, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1133, 1178 (2002).
59. 794 N.E.2d 18 (N.Y. 2003).
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Florida for family reasons, Reuters provided her with a laptop, hardware,
and software in order to continue her work with Reuters through a
telephone connection to the Internet. 61 Reuters and Allen were in
constant contact, with Reuters giving assignments and generally
supervising her work via electronic mail.6 2
Allen had to be available for work between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00
p.m. 63 Every weekday, she logged onto her employer's computer servers
in New York through a connection to the Intemet. 64 As a telecommuter,
Allen was able to complete the exact same duties for which she was
responsible in New York; to wit, "monitor the performance of her
employer's financial systems, troubleshoot, and recommend system
changes and enhancements., 65 Throughout the duration of their
telecommuting arrangement, Allen visited Reuter's New York office
only once for a period of two weeks.6 6
Reuters and Allen maintained their telecommuting arrangement
until March 1999 when Reuters informed Allen that it was terminating
the arrangement due to its high maintenance costs. 67 Reuters offered
Allen a position in its New York office, but Allen chose to stay in
Florida with her family instead; at which point, Allen's employment
with Reuters came to an end.68
After her application for UI benefits was rejected in Florida, Allen
applied to receive UI benefits from New York, the state from which
Reuters supervised Allen's work. 69 Allen's New York UI application
was rejected by a Commissioner of Labor, and the decision was affirmed
by the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. 70 The Agency's denial
of benefits was grounded on the fact that Allen's services were not
localized in New York during the base period. 1

60. See id. at 19.
61.

See id.

62. See id. Allen had to request permission to arrive early or leave late, send electronic mail
containing the weekly status reports to her employer, and respond to employer directives via
telephone or electronic mail. See id. at 20.
at 19.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 20.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id.In New York, the base period of employment is the last four completed calendar
quarters that end the week immediately before a claim is filed. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 520 (2002).
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The central issue before the New York Court of Appeals was
whether a telecommuter's services performed over the Internet may be
deemed as localized within the state where the employer supervises or
controls the telecommuter's services.72 The court of appeals held that
physical presence within the state is the "most practicable indicium of
localization for the interstate telecommuter who inhabits today's
'virtual' workplace linked by Internet connections and data
exchanges. 73
In reaching its decision, the court of appeals rejected Allen's
argument that her services were realized on her employer's mainframe in
New York despite the fact that she initiated the process in Florida.74
Rather than examining the realities of the twenty-first century
workplace, it relied on a policy memorandum issued by the national
Social Security Board in 1937,75 a time when the Internet, much less
telecommuting, was utterly inconceivable. Instead, the New York court
found persuasive support for its reliance on physical presence in
Minnesota's interpretation of the national Social Security board's
uniform definition, which was originally proposed in 1937.76
In light of the outdated notions embodied by the 1937 definition,
the Department of Labor view regarding telecommuters is certainly of
more value as persuasive precedent than a memorandum issued by the
national Social Security Board in 1937. The New York court's decision
and Minnesota's interpretation, which rely on the 1937 memo, fly in the
face of the Department of Labor's view that the telecommuter's
workplace is located at the place to which the telecommuter reports and
from which the employer supervises the telecommuter.77 This

72. See Claim ofAllen, 794 N.E.2d at 19.
73. Id. at 22.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id.at 22 n.2. Minnesota's interpretation of the uniform definition of "employment"
makes physical presence the test that determines where a telecommuter's services are localized. See
Minnesota WorkForce Center, Multistate Employment and Unemployment Tax, available at
http://www.uimn.org/tax/pamph/multistate.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2005) [hereinafter Minn.
WorkForce Center]. The Minnesota Workforce Center views the localization of telecommuter work
as follows:
Regular services include services performed in an office located in the home of the
employee if they are an integral part of the employee's regular services, and the
employer: (a) does not provide other facilities; or (b) allows the services to be performed
in the employee's home as part of a telecommuting arrangement.
Id.
77. Compare Claim ofAllen, 794 N.E.2d at 22, and Minn. WorkForce Center, supra note 76,
with Labor, Family and Medical Leave Act Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 825.11 l(a)(2) (2003) (stating
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Department of Labor view, promulgated in a regulation for the
administration of the FMLA, while not binding on New York, is more
persuasive than the 1937 memo because the Department of Labor
promulgated the regulation while contemplating the Internet and the
telecommuting possibilities that the Internet generates.78
As the next section will reveal, the New York Court of Appeals, in
a tax case, was able to reach an opposite conclusion from that reached in
Claim ofAllen. In applying a tax regulation that examines whether work
performed at home, and outside of New York, is allocable to New York
sources, the determinative test is the Convenience of the Employer test
which offends neither the Due Process Clause (of the Fourteenth
Amendment) nor the Commerce Clause.7 9
B.

In re Zelinsky v. Tax Appeal Tribunal:80 Taxation of an Out-of-State
Telecommuter's Income

The petitioner, Zelinsky, taught classes and held office hours three
days a week at Cardozo School of Law in New York City and performed
his other teaching duties from his home in Connecticut two days a
week 8 1 between 1994 and 1995.82 When it came time to file his income
tax returns, Zelinsky filed two separate returns: one for New York (for
the time he spent teaching in New York) and one for Connecticut (for
the time he spent working from home). 83 Shortly thereafter, New York's
Department of Taxation and Finance sent notices of deficiency to
Zelinsky, who contested the notices, and after exhausting his
administrative remedies, this appeal followed.84 Zelinsky argued that
New York's taxation of the income he earned while working in
Clause and the Due Process
Connecticut offended both the Commerce
85
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

that a telecommuter's worksite is located at the "office to which they report and from which
assignments are made").
78. See § 825.11 l(a)(2).
79. See Zelinsky v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 801 N.E.2d 840, 849 (N.Y. 2003). This inapposite
conclusion was reached by distinguishing Claim of Allen on the grounds that Claim of Allen
involved neither taxation nor Commerce Clause issues. See id. at 846 n.6.
80. 801 N.E.2d 840.
81. Id. at 843. In his appellate brief, Zelinsky characterized his at-home work arrangement as
a telecommuting arrangement. See id. at 846 n.6.
82. See id. at 843.
83. See id. at 844.
84. See id.
85. See id
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However, New York's Appellate Division and its Court of Appeals
held that the out-of-state commuter's income may be taxed by both the
employer's state and the commuter's state without offending the Due
Process or the Commerce Clauses.86 The New York court upheld the
Convenience of the Employer test 87 and concluded that all of the income
earned while petitioner worked in Connecticut was attributable to New
York sources 88 and was therefore subject to taxation by New York. 89 The
Convenience of the Employer test turns on whether the work performed
outside the state was required to be done outside the state, and if not,
then the work is treated as if it were performed within New York and is
deemed to be income whose source is in New York. 90
The heart of Zelinsky's appeal was that the Convenience of the
Employer test violates the requirement that a tax on an interstate
transaction be fairly apportioned. 91 The purposes of fair apportionment
are twofold: first, to guarantee that each state only taxes its fair share of
the transaction;92 and second, to prevent a taxpayer from being unfairly
burdened with multiple taxes.93 Bearing these purposes in mind, a tax is
fairly apportioned when each state levying the tax does not cause the
total tax owed to result in a multiple taxation 94 and when a state only
taxes the portion of the income that is attributable to activities conducted
within that state. 95 In essence, Zelinsky argued that New York failed to
tax only that income which was attributable to the services he provided
in taxing his income that
in New York, and, in fact, that New York erred
96
was earned while he worked in Connecticut.
The court of appeals began its analysis by questioning whether the
Convenience of the Employer test satisfied the fair apportionment
requirement and was therefore constitutional. 97 The reason why the
Convenience of the Employer test became law was to ensure that
commuters did not fraudulently reduce their income tax liability by
86. See id at 849.
87. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 132.18(a) (2003).
88. See Zelinsky, 801 N.E.2d at 844.
89. See id at 844-45.
90. See id at 844.
91. See id at 845 (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)).
92. See Zelinsky, 801 N.E.2d at 845 (quoting Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 260-61
(1989)).
93. See Zelinsky, 801 N.E.2d at 845 (quoting Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. Urbach, 750 N.E.2d
52, 58 (N.Y. 2001)).
94. See Zelinsky, 801 N.E.2d at 845.
95. See id (quoting Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 262).
96. See Zelinsky, 801 N.E.2d at 845.
97. See id at 845-46.
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claiming a full day's work performed at home when in fact only an hour
or two of work had been done. 98 Furthermore, when an out-of-state
commuter takes work home, this act is not considered interstate
commerce;9 9 for tax purposes, the work was performed in the state
where the commuter's office is located.' 00 Consequently, the
Convenience of the Employer test does not violate the Commerce Clause
because it neither burdens interstate commerce nor discriminates
between in-state taxpayers and out-of-state taxpayers.101
Another justification for the New York tax was that Cardozo
School of Law, located in New York, paid the entirety of Zelinsky's
salary regardless of where the services were performed. 0 2 Zelinsky
earned his salary solely because of the teaching opportunity afforded by
his New York-based employer.' 0 3 The court of appeals emphasized that
' 4
New York "provides a host of tangible and intangible protections,"' 0
and Zelinsky's choice to perform some of his work outside New York
did not refute that reality. 0 5 With regard to the Due Process Clause, the
New York tax levied on Zelinsky was appropriate because "some
definite link, some minimum connection" between New York and
Zelinsky was established. 10 6 The necessary link or connection required
to make the tax proper is a fiscal relationship between the benefits

98. See id.at 846 (using the example that an out-of-state commuter who works one hour per
day on the weekends may claim a full day's work in order to reduce total taxable income to fivesevenths of the income actually earned). The court also opined that if the Convenience of the
Employer test were not used, then the tax system would be even more vulnerable to fraud due to
underreported wages and the impossibility of disproving that a full day's work had been done. See
id. at 846 n.4.
99. See id. at 846.
100. See id.Since the work performed at home is "inextricably intertwined" with the business
conducted at the employer's office and is conducted at home solely for the telecommuter's
convenience, the work performed is attributable to a New York source. Id.; see also Speno v.
Gallman, 319 N.E.2d 180, 181 (N.Y. 1974) (explaining that when services are performed out-ofstate by the employee, for the employee's convenience rather than by necessity of the employer, the
earnings from these services are subject to New York taxes). But cf Claim ofAllen, 794 N.E.2d 18,
22 (N.Y. 2003) (holding that a telecommuter's work is not performed within the state which is the
source of the telecommuter's income).
101. See Zelinsky, 801 N.E.2d at 847 (citing Speno, 319 N.E.2d at 181-82). The Convenience
of the Employer test ensures that New York residents who take their work home are not at a tax
disadvantage relative to non-New York residents who take their work home. See Zelinsky, 801
N.E.2d at 847.
102. See id. at 847-48.
at 848.
103. See id.
104. Id.
105. See id.
106. Id at 849 (quoting Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306 (1992)).
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provided by New York and the tax imposed.0 7 Zelinsky's employment
at Cardozo was enough to establish the minimum connection or contact
his New York tax liability
with New York that was necessary to justify
10 8
Connecticut.
in
completed
he
for the work
Due Process is not violated by imposing tax liability on an out-ofstate telecommuter because the employment relationship is the
purposeful availment that justifies a finding of minimum contacts
between the out-of-state employee and the taxing state. 0 9 Due Process,
with regard to taxation issues, merely requires a fiscal relationship
between the person taxed and the benefits and protections afforded by
the taxing state." 0 For taxation purposes, there is a fiscal relationship
between an out-of-state telecommuter and the taxing state because the
state "provide[s] ... [a] host of tangible and intangible benefits flowing

directly and indirectly" from the taxing state to the out-of-state
telecommuter."'1
Under the reasoning in Zelinsky, Maxine Allen, the petitioner from2
Claim of Allen, would be liable for New York state income taxes"
because imposing said taxes would not offend the Due Process Clause or
the Commerce Clause. In its Commerce Clause analysis, the court
reasoned that the choice to work at home, even if the employee lives
outside the employer's state, does not transform the employment
relationship into an interstate transaction." 3 The court also rejected a
dormant Commerce Clause argument because it concluded that imposing
income tax liability neither unfairly burdens interstate commerce nor
inhibits the flow of goods in interstate marketplaces. 1 4 Moreover, instate telecommuters do not get a tax advantage because they choose to
work from home some days, and as a result, 5out-of-state telecommuters
are not at liberty to enjoy lower tax liability."

107.

See Zelinsky, 801 N.E.2d at 849 (quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435,

444 (1940)).
108.

See Zelinsky, 801 N.E.2d at 849.

109. See id. at 849.
110. See id.
111. Id.

112. Fortunately, Ms. Allen would not be burdened with multiple taxation problems since
Florida does not levy personal income taxes on its individual residents. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 220.03(aa) (excluding individuals from the definition of taxpayer); see also Fla. Department of
for
New
Residents,
available
at
Revenue,
Florida
Tax
Information
http://www.state.fl.us/dor/taxes/new.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2005).
113. See Zelinsky, 801 N.E.2d at 847.
114. See id.
115.

See id.
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Under the Convenience of the Employer test, Allen's income would
be treated as New York sourced income that is subject to New York
taxes. Under the lens of the Convenience of the Employer test, the
telecommuting arrangement resulted from Allen's need to be in Florida
with her family and not from Reuters's need to have the work completed
there; in short, the116arrangement was convenient for both the employer
and the employee.
C. Scrutiny of Claim ofAllen and Zelinsky Under a Dormant
Commerce Clause Theory
But does the court's decision in Claim of Allen, ratifying the
successive application of the localization tests to out-of-state
telecommuters, violate the Commerce Clause under a dormant
Commerce Clause theory even when imposing income tax liability on
the telecommuter is not discriminatory on its face? Yes! 117 Under the
dormant Commerce Clause theory, a state is prohibited from acting in a
manner that unfairly burdens or discriminates against out-of-state actors
relative to those located within the state. 1 8 Just as in West Lynn
Creamery, New York imposes an income tax on all New York-sourced
income regardless of whether the income was earned by New York
residents or non-New York residents while working at home. 1 9
Assuming arguendo that granting New York-disbursed UI benefits to
New York telecommuters is a rebate that becomes effective upon
involuntary termination, then such a rebate could violate the Commerce
Clause. 120 If one assumed that UI benefits are paid out of general trust
account12 1 funded by withholding taxes from New York-situated

116. The anecdotal evidence suggests that the employer and the employee are experimenting
with alternative work arrangements; there is no suggestion that an employee would be terminated
for refusal to enter into a telecommuting arrangement with the employer. See supra notes 9-11.
117. See W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 194 (1994) (holding that the
combination of a facially nondiscriminatory tax with a subsidy to in-state residents is
unconstitutional); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521-22 (1935) (invalidating a New
York pricing order that set a minimum price on milk regardless of whether the milk was produced in
or out of New York because the measure acted as a tariff to protect in-state interests).
118. See W. Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 192.
119. Compare id. at 195-96, with ZelMinsky, 801 N.E.2d at 849.
120. See W. Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 197. The facially non-discriminatory income tax
could be seen as an unconstitutional rebate if Ul benefits are disbursed from a general fund
consisting of income taxes paid by individual employees and withholding taxes paid by employers.
Cf id.
121. SeeN.Y.LAB.LAW§ 550 (2002).
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employers,12 2 then in-state telecommuters are benefiting from the taxes
paid by their employers while out-of-state telecommuters are not
receiving the same benefit.
Essentially, out-of-state telecommuters are left out in the cold while
New York residents benefit from the withholding taxes paid by the outof-state telecommuters' employers and also from the income tax paid to
New York (as mandated by the Convenience of the Employer test). This
result is untenable under a dormant Commerce Clause analysis. One way
to remedy this result is to bring the result from Claim of Allen in line
with Zelinsky by allowing UI boards to apply the Direction and Control
test to telecommuters before the Localization or the Base of Operations
tests. If the Direction and Control test becomes the primary test for both
in-state and out-of-state telecommuters, then the measure would be
applied non-discriminatorily because both types of telecommuters would
be eligible for UI benefits from the employer's state.
The imposition of tax liability on an out-of-state telecommuter and
the denial of UI benefit eligibility following the same telecommuter's
termination are incongruous results that appear to penalize an employee
simply for leaving the employer's state. Such differential treatment
between in-state telecommuters and out-of-state telecommuters could be
seen as discriminatory behavior to those situated outside the employer's
state. Such discriminatory behavior violates the Commerce Clause on a
dormant commerce clause theory that a state cannot administer its laws
in such a manner that the effect would be to cause other states to retaliate
in response. In order to avoid the appearance of discriminating against
out-of-state telecommuters, state UI laws should be amended to allow
for the use of Direction and Control as the primary test to localize
services in the employer's state.
IV.

VIRTUAL PRESENCE FOR PERSONAL JURISDICTION PURPOSES

Presumably, a telecommuter could be sued in the supervising
employer's state if, through negligence or other malfeasance, the
telecommuter causes damage to the employer. Furthermore, if a
telecommuter could be deemed to be present in the supervising
employer's state for the purposes of personal jurisdiction for
adjudication of the claim, then the telecommuter's opportunity for
benefits from the state should be as likely as the opportunity for a
122. See N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 570, 581-b (2002). Any employer with employees from out-ofstate can elect to have withholding taxes attributed to the employer's or the employee's state. See
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 561 (2002).
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finding of liability by the state's courts. The virtual presence-personal
jurisdiction cases discussed herein should guide state legislatures and UI
agencies in reaching the conclusion that out-of-state telecommuters are
present in their employers' states. After reaching such a conclusion, the
next natural step would be to adopt the Direction and Control test as the
primary indicator that an out-of-state telecommuter's employment
services were performed in the employer's state.
Although courts have not established a bright line test to determine
jurisdiction over a virtual workplace, courts have been forced to
determine whether they have personal jurisdiction over parties with an
electronic relationship.12 3 Courts have applied the minimum contacts
standard to other online relationships, which has led to two divergent
theories of Internet 124jurisdiction: virtual presence and single-point
presence jurisdiction.
A.

Virtual Presence

Under the virtual presence approach, a person puts information on
the Internet and is deemed to be present wherever the information is
available.125 For the telecommuter sending information to the
supervising employer, presence for purposes of personal jurisdiction
would tend to be wherever the supervising employer's computer or
server is physically present.
In Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.,126 plaintiff Inset
Systems, a Connecticut corporation, registered "INSET" as a federal
trademark, while defendant Instruction Set, a Massachusetts corporation,
began to advertise its products on the Internet by using the domain
address "INSET.COM" and the telephone number "I-800-USINSET."' 127 Inset Systems sued Instruction Set for trademark
infringement in federal court.1 28 In response, Instruction Set moved to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and argued that it lacked
129
sufficient minimum contacts with Connecticut to satisfy due process.

123. See Gabel & Mansfield, supra note 16, at 311.
124. See id
125. See id.
(citing Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996);
Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 116-17 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).
126. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
127. See id. at 163.
128. Seeid. at 162.
129. Seeid.
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The Inset Systems court accepted Inset Systems's argument that
Instruction Set had minimum contacts with Connecticut by virtue of its
continuous solicitation of customers from Connecticut via Internet
advertising. 130 The nature of Internet advertising is that it is constantly
available to those with access to the Internet, unlike periodic radio and
television commercials.' 31 In so reasoning, the court opined that, by
advertising on the Internet, Instruction Sets aimed its advertisements not
132
only at Connecticut customers but at anyone with Internet access.
Consequently, Instruction Set should have reasonably anticipated being
haled into court in Connecticut and any other jurisdiction whose
residents may access Instruction Set's website. 3 3 The court's holding
recognized that due process requires minimum contacts so that a
could reasonably anticipate being haled into court in
corporate defendant
34
the forum state.1
Inset Systems's reasoning requires the conclusion that a
telecommuter is virtually present where the supervising employer
accesses the telecommuter's work. A telecommuter is in daily contact
with the supervising employer by logging onto the employer's computer
mainframe to perform his or her work. The telecommuter's activities are
directed at the employer who is supervising, assigning, or otherwise
controlling her work. For example, in Claim of Allen, the claimant was
in constant contact with her employer over the Internet receiving work
35
assignments and being supervised via electronic mail. 1'
B. Single Point Presence
Despite its more complicated approach to determining jurisdiction,
single point presence analysis of telecommuters' employment activities
shows sufficient minimum contacts for telecommuters to reasonably
anticipate being haled into court in the forum state. 136 Telecommuters'

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

See
See
See
See
See

id. at 164.
id.at 165.
id.
id.
id. at 164 (citing Worldwide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297

(1980)).
135. See In re Claim of Allen, 794 N.E.2d 18, 19 (N.Y. 2003). The claimant had been required
to be available for work on the employer's mainframe between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.
See id.
136. See generally CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1263-66 (6th Cir. 1996)
(describing the qualities of an electronic defendant-fonm state relationship that allow a proper
finding of personal jurisdiction over the defendant); Zippo Mfg. Corp. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952
F. Supp. 1119, 1123-25, 1127 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that personal jurisdiction depends on the
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employment activities could be deemed purposeful availment of the
benefits and protections provided by the forum state's laws. Courts use a
"sliding scale" to analyze whether the Internet interactions satisfy
minimum contacts 137 and are more likely to have personal jurisdiction
where the defendant "purposefully availed himself of the jurisdiction by
'deliberately and repeatedly' transmitting information into the forum
state.' 3 8 Courts are least likely to find they have personal jurisdiction
over a defendant "whose website simply
contains information...
' 139
[b]ecause such websites are not interactive."
4
1. CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson1 0
In CompuServe, defendant Richard Patterson, a Texas resident, had
entered into a Shareware Registration Agreement with plaintiff
CompuServe, an Ohio corporation, to post his company's shareware on
CompuServe's website and computer system.' 4' The court took special
note of the fact that Patterson's acceptance of the terms of the Shareware
Registration Agreement was initiated on Patterson's computer in Texas
but was ultimately transmitted to CompuServe's computer servers in
Ohio.142 During the course of their three year business relationship,
Patterson transmitted shareware files to CompuServe's servers and
advertised his shareware on CompuServe's system. 143 Eventually,
CompuServe began providing its users with a program that Patterson
claimed was very similar to his own shareware; Patterson complained
to
44
1
trademarks.
law
common
his
infringing
was
it
that
CompuServe
The ensuing friction led CompuServe to file suit against Patterson
in United States District Court in Ohio for declaratory judgment stating
that CompuServe neither infringed Patterson's common law trademarks
nor engaged in unfair or deceptive trade practices. 145 Patterson moved to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction which the district court

nature and quality of the contact between the defendant and the forum state); see also Gabel &
Mansfield, supra note 16, at 311.
137. See Gabel & Mansfield, supra note 16, at 311 (citing Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. at
1124).

138. Gabel & Mansfield, supra note 16, at 311-12 (quoting Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. at
1124 and citing CompuServe, Inc., 89 F.3d at 1265).
139. Gabel & Mansfield, supra note 16, at 312 (citing Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F.
Supp. 295, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
140. 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
141. Id. at 1260.
142. Id. at 1260-61.
143. Id. at 1261.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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granted. 146 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal because
the court acknowledged that physical presence within the forum state is
not necessary to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 147
The CompuServe court reasoned that Patterson purposefully availed
himself of the benefits and protections of Ohio law through his
interactions with CompuServe. 48 The fact that Patterson had transmitted
files to CompuServe for three years and had intended to continue the
relationship indicates the "ongoing nature" of CompuServe and
Patterson's relationship.149 Because Patterson had put his software on
CompuServe's system and advertised on CompuServe's
website,
50
Ohio.1
in
business
in
engaged
purposefully
had
Patterson
51
2. Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King'
In Bensusan, plaintiff Bensusan Restaurant Corporation sued
defendant Richard King for trademark infringement in a United States
District Court in New York. 52 Bensusan runs the The Blue Note jazz
club in New York city, and King does business as The Blue Note in
Missouri; King started a website advertising his jazz club on the
Internet. 53 King moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and
argued that merely having an informational
website is not sufficient to
54
establish minimum contacts in New York.
The district court granted King's motion to dismiss because the
website did not require any sustained interaction between King and any
New York residents. 55 King's website merely contained general
information about upcoming events and ticket information.1 56 In fact,
King had never done anything to solicit customers from New York, and
other than his website, he had never been present New York. 157 Unlike
the defendant in CompuServe, King had no contact with New York,
much less sustained contact; therefore, the court reached an opposite

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
See id. at 1264 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)).
See CompuServe, Inc., 89 F.3d at 1264.
Id. at 1265.
See id.
937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
Id. at297.

153. Id.

154.
155.
156.
157.

See id.at298, 301.
Id.at299, 301.
Id. at297.
See id. at 301.
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conclusion from CompuServe due to the lack of sustained contact and
presence in the forum state.' 58
59
3. Zippo Manufacturing Corp. v. Zippo Dot Corn'
In Zippo, Zippo Manufacturing, a Pennsylvania corporation that
makes lighters, had a registered trademark for its name, Zippo.'6 0 Zippo
Manufacturing sued Zippo Dot Com ("Dot Com"), a California
corporation that operates an internet news service, for trademark dilution
and infringement because Dot Com had gotten the exclusive rights to
use "zippo.com," "zippo.net," and "zipponews.com. ' ' 61 In response, Dot
Com moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction 162 because 1its
63
offices, employees, and computer servers were located in California;
Dot Corn's contacts with Pennsylvania took64place solely over the
Internet with its 3,000 Pennsylvania customers. 1
After reviewing the purposeful availment and minhimum contacts
tests, the Zippo court held that the exercise of personal jurisdiction
depends on the nature, quality, and quantity of interactions over the
Internet between the defendant and residents of the forum state.165 At
one end of the sliding scale, personal jurisdiction is appropriate where
the defendant interacts with a resident of another state such that
maintenance of the relationship requires "knowing and repeated
transmission[s] of computer files over the Internet.', 166 At the other end
of the scale, exercising personal jurisdiction is inappropriate where a
defendant erects an informational website and the out-of-state visitor to
the website does not interact with the defendant to conduct business or
otherwise maintain a relationship. 167 When encountering cases that fall
in the middle of the sliding scale, 68 the court must scrutinize the "level
of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information
that occurs on the Web site.' 69 Ultimately, the court held that Dot Corn

158. Id.
159. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
160. See id. at 1121.

161, Id.
162. Id.
163. Seeid.atll21.
164. Id.

165. See id. at 1124.
166.

See id. (citing CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996)).

167. See Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (citing Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F.
Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).

168. An example is where the defendant and the out-of-state visitor to the website merely
exchange information. See Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
169. Id. (citing Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1338 (E.D. Mo. 1996)).
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purposely availed itself of Pennsylvania law0 by conducting business
with Pennsylvania residents over the Internet.17
Both the virtual presence and single presence approaches require
the finding that a telecommuter's presence is sufficient to justify
personal jurisdiction in the supervising employer's state. Therefore, if a
telecommuter may be found liable for damages in the supervising
employer's state, then, fairness and public policy should require that a
telecommuter is eligible to receive UI benefits from the supervising
employer's state upon discharge.
In light of the New York Court of Appeals's willingness to locate
Zelinsky's services in New York and other jurisdictions' virtual
presence analyses, UI boards in the future should not hesitate to locate
an out-of-state telecommuter's services in the employer's state. In fact,
the New York Court of Appeals in Zelinsky recognized that the
necessary minimum contact between New York and petitioner, who
claimed to be a telecommuter, existed by virtue of the employment
relationship between Cardozo Law School and Zelinsky. 171 Zelinsky's
decision to continue his employment relationship with Cardozo
constituted his purposeful availment of the benefits and protections
provided by New York.172 State agencies that successively apply the
localization tests contained in the uniform definition of employment
cause the inapposite result of locating the out-of-state telecommuter's
work outside the employer's state when that same state would claim
income taxes from and exert personal jurisdiction over the telecommuter
because of the work performed for the employer in that same state. The
Direction and Control test should be applied as the primary test to
telecommuters if only to create symmetrical results with regard to U!
benefit approval, income tax liability, and exercises of personal
jurisdiction.

170.
171.
172.

Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. at 1125-26.
See Zelinsky v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 801 N.E.2d 840, 849 (N.Y. 2003).
See id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2004

25

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 10
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

V.

[Vol. 33:785

CONTINUED ELIGIBILITY FOR UI BENEFITS

Once a claimant demonstrates eligibility to receive UI benefits, the
claimant must continue to be eligible for the benefits by showing that he
or she is ready, willing, and able to work. Every state requires a UT
recipient to show that reasonable efforts have been made to find a
suitable new position. 173 Depending on the state, a suitable new position
means either: being available for work, available for suitable work, or
"[a]vailable for... [w]ork in [the claimant's] usual occupation or for
' 74
which [claimant is] reasonably fitted by prior training or experience.'
If a claimant rejects an offer for a suitable new position, then the UI
recipient is no longer eligible to collect UI benefits. States monitor their
UI recipients' continued availability for work by requiring the recipients
to register with a local state unemployment office and to regularly report
for work at the unemployment office; at such time, the recipient must
search efforts have been made to find a new suitable
indicate what
75
position.

1

State UI programs are most vulnerable to fraudulent claims, and the
resulting overpayments, after the initial determination of eligibility for
UT benefits is made; billions of dollars in overpayments were made
because UT claimants did not report or underreported their income when
they try to show continued eligibility for UT benefits. In 2001, the
General Accounting Office determined that $2.4 billion of the $30
76
billion paid out in UT benefits in the United States were overpayments.1177
Of that $2.4 billion, $560 million was attributable to fraud or abuse.
173. See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1253(c), (e) (West 1986 & Supp. 2003) (requiring UI
recipients to be able to and be available for work and to search for suitable work); N.Y. LAB. LAW
§ 593(2) (2002) (disqualifying a recipient for refusing a job offer that is a reasonable fit in training
and experience for the recipient, unless the job offer pays considerably lower wages than those paid
for a similar job in the same region); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.29(A)(4)(a) (Anderson 2001)
(requiring recipients to be able and be available for suitable work); see also U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
STATE LAW PROVISIONS CONCERNING NONMONETARY ELIGIBILITY 4.18 t.400 available at
http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/pdf/2001 ch400.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2005); U.S. Dep't of
Labor, Nonmonetary Eligibility, at http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/pdf/nonmonetary.htm.
174. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, STATE LAW PROVISIONS CONCERNING NONMONETARY
ELIGIBILITY 4.18 t.400.

175. See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1253(b) (West 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 443.09 1(1)(b) (West 2002); N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 591(4), 596(4) (2002).
176. Unemployment Insurance: Enhanced Focus on Program Integrity Could Reduce
Overpayments: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Human Res., Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th
Cong. 2 (2002) (testimony of Sigurd R. Nilsen, Director, Education, Workforce, and Income
Security Issues, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d02820t.pdf [hereinafter Nilsen Testimony].
177. Id. However, the states' benefit payment control divisions reported an overpayment figure
that totals to $650 million. See id. at 4. In addition, the Department of Labor's overpayment figure is
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Fraud occurs when claimants intentionally falsify eligibility information,
file fraudulent claims, or fail to report earnings.17 8 Of the $560 million
attributable to fraud, $313 million (56%) were due to unreported
earnings. "9
Some states' inability to verify self-reported earnings contributes to
UI claimants' fraud on the system; 180 however, there are computerized
databases that would decrease benefit overpayments due to fraud.' 8' For
example, each state is required to run a "Wage/Benefit Crossmatch" that
cross-references UI benefits recipients against another database that has
those individuals' wages. 182 The only problem with the crossmatch is
allows UI recipients to
that it is only performed quarterly, so the time lag
83
receive a substantial amount of overpayments.1
However, the time lag problem with the crossmatch could be solved
if each state used their federally-mandated state new hires directory 184 as
a cross-reference for the Ul claimants' self-reported information. The
state new hire directories are updated more often than the crossmatch
databases. While the crossmatch databases are only updated every
calendar quarter, the state new hires directories are updated on a monthly
basis (roughly) because once an employer hires an employee, that
employer is required by state law to report the new hire to the state
employment security department within twenty days. 85 One of the states
visited by the General Accounting Office for its 2002 study reported that
its overpayments decreased by 75% after it started using the new hires
database. 186 Unfortunately, many states do not use their state new hire

believed to be more reliable because the Labor Department's quality assurance investigators
typically spend more time investigating overpayment claims than do state benefit payment control
investigators. See id. at 7.
178. See id. at 5-6.
179. See id.at 6.
180. See id. at 8-9. Some states use "automated data resources ... [while] others rely heavily
on self-reported information from claimants" to determine benefit disbursements. Id
181. See id at 9.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. 42 U.S.C. § 653a(g)(2) (2000). Federal law also allows state agencies responsible for
administering employment security and worker compensation programs to use the new hires data to
verify eligibility for program participation. See 42 U.S.C. § 653a(h)(3) (2000).
185. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.2576(4) (West 2002); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
405/1801.1(B) (West 1993 & Supp. 2003); Act of Dec. 23, 2003, § 1, 2003 Ohio Laws 46
(providing that state new hires data may be used to administer the unemployment compensation
program), available at http://www.legislature.state.oh.us,BillText125/125SB92_EN.N.pdf.
186. See Nilsen Testimony, supra note 176, at 10.
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directories to verify the accuracy of UI claimants' self-reported
information, and as a result, these states are more susceptible to losses
from fraudulent claims of continued eligibility for UI.
The state-maintained databases only report information from
employers within a given UI recipient's state; 1 7 consequently, a
recipient who gets another position that requires out-of-state
telecommuting could get away with fraud if the benefit-disbursing state
does not try to verify the self-reported information of the UI recipient.
Fortunately, there are four nationally-maintained databases that could
reduce UI fraud by out-of-state telecommuters. 88 First, the Department
of Labor maintains a database, Interstate Crossmatch, that can help states
89
discover unreported or under-reported wages earned in other states.
Another national database, Interstate Inquiry, lets states check individual
UI claimant's wages earned in other states. 190 The National Directory of
New Hires' 9' maintains Ul, wage, and new hires information across the
country, but current law prohibits states from getting the information to
verify eligibility for UI. 92 Finally, the Department of Labor maintains
the Wage Record Interchange System (WRIS), and it makes UI wage
and employment records of individuals in other states available to each
state.' 93

VI. CONCLUSION
Telecommuting gained in popularity by leaps and bounds over the
last decade, and it is an example of technology racing ahead of the law
once again. Because at least one court. and one state legislature have
chosen to rely on the policy considerations for a uniform definition of
employment proposed in 1937, millions of employees are exposed to the
risk of ineligibility for UI benefits.

187. See id. at 10.
188. See id. at 10-11.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. 42 U.S.C. § 653(i)(2) (2000) (requiring states to furnish new hires, wage, and UI
compensation data to the National Directory of New Hires within two business days of when such
data becomes available to the state).
192. See id. at § 653() (2000).
193. WRIS was created by the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 and costs about $2 million
per year to administer. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 2871(0(2) (2003); Nilsen Testimony, supra note 176, at
11 n.11.
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It is time for legislatures, courts, and Unemployment Insurance
Boards to abandon the perception of the 1937 workplace and catch up to
the twenty-first century reality of the workplace. The policy
considerations for the 1937 uniform definition no longer exist. UI
benefit awards depend on the amount of wages earned by the claimant
during the base period rather than on a given state's cost of living.
Furthermore, the Internet has made it possible for job seekers to widen
the geographic scope of their job search beyond the community or state
in which they are physically present.
As the discussion in Part III suggests, states, like New York, tax
out-of-state telecommuters for work performed outside their employers'
states in violation of the Constitution. For taxation purposes, income
from work performed by an out-of-state telecommuter is taxed because
the employer, located in the taxing state, is the source of that income.
The New York Court of Appeals ratified the tax because an employee's
decision to bring home work was not substantial enough to constitute
interstate commerce, and the dormant Commerce Clause was not
violated because both in-state and out-of-state telecommuters were
equally liable for the tax.
However, locating an out-of-state employee's income within the
employer's state because the opportunity to work arose in said state
while placing the services outside the state for UI benefit purposes, as
per the court's decision in Claim ofAllen, is untenable and incongruous.
A telecommuting arrangement between an employer and an out-of-state
employee is a sustained relationship that is substantially different from
the one contemplated in Zelinsky where an out-of-state commuter takes
work home occasionally or only in isolated instances. In fact, it is the
sustained relationship characteristic of telecommuting arrangements that
would justify locating an out-of-state telecommuter's work in the office
from which the employer directs and controls, or supervises and assigns
work.
It is also no small coincidence that personal jurisdiction over an
out-of-state telecommuter would be proper in the employer's state if a
telecommuter's negligence or malfeasance were to damage the
employer's property in some way.
Since personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state telecommuter is
proper and an out-of-state telecommuter can be taxed in the employer's
state, it is fitting and proper that the Direction and Control test should
supercede the other tests to localize a telecommuter's services for UI
purposes in the employer's state, especially in light of the fact that a
state is not made more vulnerable to fraudulent claims arising from
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unreported or underreported income from UI recipients. There are
already crossmatch, interstate inquiry, and new hire databases in place to
prevent any fraud that could be committed by an out-of-state
telecommuter.
Beverly Reyes*
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